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If you do know, what would you saythat knowledge is based on? Perhaps you will say it is basedon your direct experience of eating it, but the more accurateanswer should probably be that your knowledge is based on a memoryexperience you are presently having, a memory experience whichfeels like it is an accurate memory of an experience you hadyesterday.

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Jump to navigation Jump to search. This is not an easy thing to do, because even a casual glance at the literature shows that epistemic, theoretical, and methodological concerns constitute the driving force behind argument. Defined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge andjustified belief. As the study of knowledge, epistemology is concernedwith the following questions: What are the necessary and sufficientconditions of knowledge?

What are its sources? What is its structure,and what are its limits? As the study of justified belief, epistemologyaims to answer questions such as: How we are to understand the conceptof justification? What makes justified beliefs justified? Understood morebroadly, epistemology is about issues having to do with thecreation and dissemination of knowledge in particular areas of inquiry.

This article will provide a systematic overview of the problems thatthe questions above raise and focus in some depth on issues relating tothe structure and the limits of knowledge and justification. There are various kinds of knowledge: knowing how to do something for example, how to ride a bicycle , knowing someone in person, andknowing a place or a city.

We may distinguish, broadly,between a traditional and a non-traditional approach to answering thisquestion. False propositions cannotbe known. Spotify cracked pc reddit. Therefore, knowledge requires truth. Therefore, knowledge requires belief. Thus we arrive at atripartite analysis of knowledge as JTB: S knows that p if and only if p is true and S isjustified in believing that p. According to this analysis, thethree conditions — truth, belief, and justification — areindividually necessary and jointly sufficient for knowledge.

They diverge, however, as soon as weproceed to be more specific about exactly how justification is tofulfill this role. According to evidentialism , what makes a belief justified inthis sense is the possession of evidence.

NTK,on the other hand, conceives of the role of justification differently. One prominent idea is that this is accomplished if, and onlyif, a belief originates in reliable cognitive processes or faculties. This view is known as reliabilism. The tripartite analysis of knowledge as JTB has been shown to beincomplete. There are cases of JTB that do not qualify as cases ofknowledge.

JTB, therefore, is not sufficient for knowledge. Cases like that — known as Gettier-cases [5] —arise because neither the possession of evidence nor origination inreliable faculties is sufficient for ensuring that a belief is not truemerely because of luck.

Consider the well-known case of barn-facades:Henry drives through a rural area in which what appear to be barns are,with the exception of just one, mere barn facades. From the road Henryis driving on, these facades look exactly like real barns. According to NTK, his belief is justified because Henry'sbelief originates in a reliable cognitive process: vision. Yet Henry'sbelief is plausibly viewed as being true merely because of luck.

To state conditions that are jointly sufficient for knowledge, whatfurther element must be added to JTB? This is known as the Gettierproblem. According to TK, solving the problem requires a fourthcondition. According to some NTK theorists, it calls for refining theconcept of reliability. Some NTK theorists bypass the justification condition altogether.

They would say that, if we conceive of knowledge as reliably producedtrue belief, there is no need for justification. Reliabilism, then,comes in two forms: as a theory of justification or as a theory ofknowledge. As the former, it views justification to be an importantingredient of knowledge but, unlike TK, grounds justification solely inreliability.

As a theory of knowledge, reliabilism asserts thatjustification is not necessary for knowledge; rather, reliably producedtrue belief provided the notion of reliability is suitably refined torule out Gettier cases is sufficient for it. Second, what makes beliefs justified? It is important to keep these issues apart because adisagreement on how to answer the second question will be a mere verbaldispute, if the disagreeing parties have different concepts ofjustification in mind.

Here is an example: Tom asked Martha a question, and Martharesponded with a lie. Was she justified in lying? What might Jane mean when she thinks thatMartha was justified in responding with a lie? A natural answer isthis: She means that Martha was under no obligation to refrainfrom lying. This understanding ofjustification, commonly labeled deontological , may be definedas follows: S is justified in doing x if and only if S is not obliged to refrain from doing x.

Suppose, when we apply the word justification not to actions butto beliefs, we mean something analogous. What kind of obligations are relevant when we wish to assess whether a belief , rather than an action, is justified or unjustified? Whereas when we evaluate an action, we are interested in assessing theaction from either a moral or a prudential point of view, when it comesto beliefs, what matters is the pursuit of truth.

Therelevant kinds of obligations, then, are those that arise when we aimat having true beliefs. Exactly what, though, must we do in thepursuit of this aim?

According to one answer, the one favored byevidentialists, we ought to believe in accord with our evidence. Forthis answer to be helpful, we need an account of what our evidenceconsists of. According to another answer, we ought to follow thecorrect epistemic norms. If this answer is going to help us figure outwhat obligations the truth-aim imposes on us, we need to be given anaccount of what the correct epistemic norms are. The deontological understanding of the concept of justification iscommon to the way philosophers such as Descartes, Locke, Moore andChisholm have thought about justification.

Today, however, the dominantview is that the deontological understanding of justification isunsuitable for the purposes of epistemology. Two chief objections havebeen raised against conceiving of justification deontologically. First,it has been argued that DJ presupposes that we can have a sufficientlyhigh degree of control over our beliefs. But beliefs are akin not toactions but rather things such as digestive processes, sneezes, orinvoluntary blinkings of the eye.

The idea is that beliefs simply arisein or happen to us. Therefore, beliefs are not suitable fordeontological evaluation. This claim is typically supportedby describing cases involving either a benighted, culturally isolatedsociety or subjects who are cognitively deficient.

Such cases involvebeliefs that are claimed to be epistemically defective even though itwould not seem that the subjects in these cases are under anyobligation to refrain from believing as they do.

What makes the beliefsin question epistemically defective is that they are formed usingunreliable and intellectually faulty methods. The reason why thesubjects, from their own point of view, are not obliged to believeotherwise is that they are either cognitively deficient or live in abenighted and isolated community.

DJ says that such beliefs arejustified. If they meet the remaining necessary conditions,DJ-theorists would have to count them as knowledge. According to theobjection, however, the beliefs in question, even if true, could notpossibly qualify as knowledge, due to the epistemically defective waythey were formed.

Consequently, DJ must be rejected. Thetechnical sense is meant to make the term suitable for the needs of epistemology. What does it mean for a belief to be justified in anon-deontological sense? Let us say that this is accomplished when a true belief instantiatesthe property of proper probabilification.

We may, then, definenon-deontological justification as follows:. If we wish to pin down exactly what probabilification amounts to, wewill have to deal with a variety of tricky issues. Those who prefer NDJ to DJ would say thatprobabilification and deontological justification can diverge: it'spossible for a belief to be deontologically justified without beingproperly probabilified.

This is just what cases involving benightedcultures or cognitively deficient subjects are supposed to show. According toevidentialists, it is the possession of evidence. What is it, though,to possess evidence for believing that p? Some evidentialistswould say it is to be in a mental state that represents p asbeing true. For example, if the coffee in your cup tastes sweet to you,then you have evidence for believing that the coffee is sweet.

If youfeel a throbbing pain in your head, you have evidence for believingthat you have a headache. If you have a memory of having had cereal forbreakfast, then you have evidence for a belief about the past: a beliefabout what you ate when you had breakfast. In this view, evidenceconsists of perceptual, introspective, memorial, and intuitionalexperiences, and to possess evidence is to have an experience of thatkind. So according to this evidentialism, what makes you justified inbelieving that p is your having an experience that represents p as being true.

Many reliabilists, too, would say that the experiences mentioned inthe previous paragraph matter. However, they would deny thatjustification is solely a matter of having suitable experiences.

Rather, they hold that a belief is justified if, and only if, itresults from cognitive origin that is reliable: an origin that tends toproduce true beliefs and therefore properly probabilifies the belief. Reliabilists, then, would agree that the beliefs mentioned in theprevious paragraph are justified. But according to a standard form ofreliabilism, what makes them justified is not the possession ofevidence, but the fact that the types of processes in which theyoriginate — perception, introspection, memory, and rationalintuition — are reliable.

In contemporary epistemology, there has been an extensive debate onwhether justification is internal or external. Internalists claim thatit is internal; externalists deny it. How are we to understand theseclaims? To understand what the internal-external distinction amounts to, weneed to bear in mind that, when a belief is justified, there issomething that makes it justified.

Likewise, if a belief isunjustified, there is something that makes it unjustified. The dispute over whether justification is internal orexternal is a dispute about what the J-factors are. Among those who think that justification is internal, there is nounanimity on how to understand the concept of internality. We candistinguish between two approaches.

According to the first,justification is internal because we enjoy a special kind of access toJ-factors: they are always recognizable on reflection. Externalists deny that J-factors meet either one of theseconditions. Evidentialism is typically associated with internalism, andreliabilism with externalism. Evidentialism says, at aminimum, two things:. Whether evidentialism is also an instance of accessibilityinternalism is a more complicated issue.

The conjunction of E1 and E2by itself implies nothing about the recognizability of justification. Recall, however, that in Section 1. TK advocates, among which evidentialismenjoys widespread sympathy, tend to endorse the following twoclaims:. Necessity a priori recognizable, necessary principles say what isevidence for what. Although E1 and E2 by themselves do not imply access internalism, itis quite plausible to maintain that evidentialism, when embellishedwith Luminosity and Necessity, becomes an instance of access internalism.

Next, let us consider why reliabilism is an externalist theory. Whereas the sources might qualify as mental, their reliability doesnot. Therefore, reliabilists reject mentalist internalism.

Hence reliabilists reject access internalism as well. If evidentialism is true, asubject who is radically deceived will be mislead about what isactually the case, but not about what he is justified in believing. If,on the other hand, reliabilism is true, then such a subject will bemisled about both what is actually the case and what he is justified inbelieving. Let us see why.

He is going to have perfectly ordinaryexperiences, just like Tim. For example, when Tim believes he has hands, he is right. His hands werediscarded, along with the rest of his limbs and torso.

When Timbelieves he is drinking coffee, he is right. For even though he is deceived about hisexternal situation, he is not deceived about his evidence: the waythings appear to him in his experiences. This illustrates theinternality of evidentialist justification.

To the extent that this implies their unreliability, theresulting beliefs are unjustified. Consequently, he is deceived notonly about his external situation his not having hands , but alsoabout the justificational status of his belief that he has hands. Thisillustrates the externality of reliabilist justification. Some internalists take the followingprinciple to be characteristic of the internalist point of view:.

For example, they are bothjustified in believing that they have hands. This makes evidentialisman internalist theory. This makes reliabilism an externalist theory. Why think that justification is internal? One argument for theinternality of justification goes as follows: 'Justification isdeontological: it is a matter of duty-fulfillment. But duty-fulfillmentis internal. Therefore, justification is internal. Therefore, internal factors are what justify beliefs.

What, then, can be said in support ofevidentialism? Evidentialists would appeal to cases in which a beliefis reliably formed but not accompanied by any experiences that wouldqualify as evidence.

Why think that justification is external? To begin with,externalists about justification would point to the fact that animalsand small children have knowledge and thus have justified beliefs. Therefore, we must conclude that the justification theirbeliefs enjoy is external: resulting not from the possession ofevidence but from origination in reliable processes. And second,externalists would say that what we want from justification is the kindof objective probability needed for knowledge, and only externalconditions on justification imply this probability.

So justificationhas external conditions. The debate over the structure of knowledge and justification isprimarily one among those who hold that knowledge requiresjustification.

From this point of view, the structure of knowledgederives from the structure of justification. We will, therefore, focuson the latter. According to foundationalism, our justified beliefs are structured likea building: they are divided into a foundation and a superstructure,the latter resting upon the former.

Beliefs belonging to the foundationare basic. Beliefs belonging to the superstructure are nonbasic and receive justification from the justified beliefsin the foundation.

For a foundationalist account of justification to be plausible, itmust solve two problems. First, by virtue of exactly what are basicbeliefs justified? Second, how do basic beliefs justify nonbasicbeliefs? Before we address these questions, let us first consider thequestion of what it is that makes a justified belief basic in the firstplace.

Once we have done that, we can then move on to discuss by virtueof what a basic belief might be justified, and how such a belief mightjustify a nonbasic belief. Thefollowing definition captures this thought:. So you believe. Unless something very strange is going on, B is an example of ajustified belief. DB tells us that B is basic if and only if it doesnot owe its justification to any other beliefs of yours. So if B isindeed basic, there might be some item or other to which B owes itsjustification, but that item would not be another belief of yours.

Let us turn to the question of where the justification that attachesto B might come from, if we think of basicality as defined by DB. Note that DB merely tells us how B is not justified. It saysnothing about how B is justified. DB, therefore, does notanswer that question. What we need, in addition to DB, is an account of what it is that justifies a belief such as B. So B is justifiedbecause B carries with it an epistemic privilege such asinfallibility, indubitability, or incorrigibility.

Note that B is not a belief about the hat. So B is an introspectivebelief about a perceptual experience of yours. Other mental states aboutwhich a subject can have basic beliefs include such things as having aheadache, being tired, feeling pleasure, or having a desire for a cupof coffee. Beliefs about external objects do not and indeed cannotqualify as basic, for it is impossible for such beliefs to own the kindof epistemic privilege needed for the status of being basic.

According to a different version of foundationalism, B isjustified not by virtue of possessing some kind of privileged status,but by some further mental state of yours. That mental state, however,is not a further belief of yours. Accordingto this alternative proposal, B and E are distinct mental states. The idea is that what justifies B is E. Since E is an experience,not a belief of yours, B is, according to DB, basic.

Experiential foundationalismis less restrictive. According to it, beliefs about external objectscan be basic as well. Suppose instead of B , you believe.

Unlike B , H is about the hat itself, and not the way the hatappears to you. Such a belief is not one about which we are infallibleor otherwise epistemically privileged.

Privilege foundationalism would,therefore, classify H as nonbasic. It is, however, quite plausible tothink that E justifies not only B but H as well.

If E is indeedwhat justifies H , and H does not receive any additionaljustification from any further beliefs of yours, then H qualifies,according to DB, as basic.

Experiential Foundationalism, then, combines to two crucial ideas: i when a justified belief is basic, its justification is not owed toany other belief; ii what in fact justifies basic beliefs areexperiences. It is unclear, therefore, how privilege foundationalismcan account for the justification of ordinary perceptual beliefs like H. Experiential foundationalism, on the other hand, has no trouble atall explaining how ordinary perceptual beliefs are justified: they arejustified by the perceptual experiences that give rise to them.

Thiscould be viewed as a reason for preferring experiential foundationalismto privilege foundationalism. Above, we noted that how to think of basicality is notuncontroversial. Since the release, the program has received multiple updates , and the development team continues to add new functionalities. N has been encouraging users to create help centres and forums on the internet. You can easily find multiple tutorials and guides to help you with content creation.

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